Chapter 6
To properly assess the Pentagon's current approach to news-media
planning, it is necessary to review recent history-especially
those mistakes and/or failures which occurred in Grenada, Panama
and Desert Storm.
In the 1980s, as now, there were numerous Department of Defense
(DOD) directives prescribing military responsibilities for supporting
the news media. In addition to a detailed document governing the
management and employment of the DOD National Media Pool (DNMP),
the most important directive with regard to media planning was,
and is, Planning Guidance-Public Affairs, issued by the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).1
This publication is primarily directed to the commanders-in-chief
of the major combatant commands (or "unified" commands,
as they are commonly called), i.e., Atlantic Command, Central
Command, European Command, Pacific Command, Southern Command,
Space Command, Strategic Command, Special Operations Command,
and Transportation Command. All of these commanders are officers
of four-star rank, representing the four military services.
The introduction to the public-affairs directive sets its basic
tone: "DOD policy is to make timely and accurate information
available to the public, Congress, and the press and to provide
the media access to cover U.S. military operations to the maximum
degree possible consistent with mission security and safety of
U.S. forces."
The directive further emphasizes the need for the combatant commander
and his/her staff to work closely with the assistant secretary
of defense for public affairs and his/her staff in planning and
executing the most effective public affairs effort possible in
each military operation. It gives detailed instructions on providing
support to the media in such areas as transportation, communications,
billeting, messing, and emergency medical treatment and offers
guidance in areas such as accreditation of reporters, reporting
ground rules, and security review of news reports.
Legacy of Vietnam
With such detailed guidance on the conduct of news-media planning,
why did past failures occur?
Research for this report indicates that, prior to the 1990s, the
prevailing view among military personnel was that relations with
the news media should be handled only by assigned public affairs
personnel. Other service members became involved only when the
public affairs officers requested that they do so. The unique
nature of the Vietnam War accentuated this attitude on the part
of commanders.
Vietnam consisted of widespread small-unit actions, conducted
mostly during the daytime. Reporters were transported to and from
the field by military aircraft, often accompanied by public affairs
personnel. They were free to observe and report on the combat
operations, which normally occurred in a limited geographic space.
Because there was not a strong imperative for secrecy, reporters
were able to file their copy without the censorship employed in
prior conflicts; they were required only to abide by published
ground rules. Combat actions in Vietnam were quite repetitive
in nature, and over time military/news media interactions became
highly stereotyped. Military commanders and personnel in the field
scarcely took notice of reporters. To them, dealing with the news
media was the purview of the public affairs personnel.
By the time of Grenada in 1983, there was an entire generation
of military officers who did not think "public affairs."
Most felt they had more to lose than to gain by interacting with
the press. While the DOD and JCS directives required news media
planning for military operations, commanders did not understand
this to be an integral part of the overall planning. The attitude
was that, if the media showed interest in covering an operation,
the public affairs personnel could handle any arrangements required.
Public affairs officers conducted their planning independently
from the operators and were rarely familiar with details of the
plan for military action.
Few military personnel outside the public affairs field were aware
of the progressive growth in the size and diversity of the news
media in the years after Vietnam. When Grenada appeared on the
horizon, the military prepared for the operation as they had for
past missions. Commanders considered only the operational aspects
of the deployment, excluding public affairs personnel from the
planning even more than was normally the case because of pre-invasion
secrecy imposed by the White House.2
As the operation commenced and 600 reporters arrived on Barbados
seeking to cover the impending conflict on Grenada, the operational
commanders were caught unprepared. They had allowed themselves
to get into a situation that even their public affairs officers
could not salvage. Preoccupied with the demands of the operation,
they reacted by denying reporters access to Grenada during the
first two days of the conflict. They said it was simply "too
hard" to make plans to accommodate 600 reporters in the heat
of battle. Lack of planning, rather than an attempt to prevent
news coverage of the conflict, caused the military's media failure
in Grenada; their sin was one of omission rather than commission.
Although the news organizations-understandably-registered loud
protests over their treatment in Grenada, the military's approach
to media relations did not change as it should have. Attitudinal
changes do not occur readily in organizations as large as the
military. Also, Grenada was a relatively small operation, and
only a fraction of the military was involved or aware of what
occurred there.
A flawed solution
The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Vessey,
did convene the Sidle Commission to review the Grenada debacle,
an action which resulted in the establishment of the DOD National
Media Pool [DNMP].3 Ironically, however, this
proved to be counterproductive to improved public affairs planning
by military commanders. Many in the military had the impression
that the DNMP would smooth future relations with the press, obviating
any need for military commanders to become more involved in the
public affairs process than they had been before.
This flaw was exposed in the Panama operation in 1989, when the
DNMP was deployed without involvement of those local military
commanders whose support was necessary for reporters to operate
in-country . As in Grenada, members of the press were only able
to cover the later stages of the operation, after the critical
phase of the conflict was over.
Subsequently, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
Pete Williams requested Fred Hoffman, former Associated Press
Pentagon correspondent, to analyze the news media aspects of the
Panama conflict and provide recommendations for corrective actions.4
In addition, General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, sent a message to the major military commanders, stressing
the importance of planning and support for news media coverage
of military operations. It read, in part:
Commanders are reminded that the media aspects of military operations
are important ... and warrant your personal attention. ... Media
coverage and pool support requirements must be planned simultaneously
with operational plans and should address all aspects of operational
activity, including direct combat, medical, prisoner-of-war, refugee,
equipment repair, refueling and rearming, civic action, and stabilization
activities. Public Affairs annexes should receive command attention
when formulating and reviewing all such plans.
This directive helped greatly to change attitudes within the military
and to convince commanders that public affairs planning was an
important part of overall operational planning, not just the responsibility
of public affairs officers. [See Appendix III, pp. 193-195.]
When Iraq unleashed its sneak attack on Kuwait in August 1990,
no one in the American military or media had given prior thought
to covering the type of war that was to evolve there. However,
in the six-month period prior to the commencement of hostilities,
the Pentagon, military and press had worked together to develop
plans that would make the Persian Gulf coverage the most comprehensive
wartime news coverage in history.
Nevertheless, there were lingering attitude problems within elements
of the military which prevented the Gulf War coverage from being
as good as it should have been. Once again, news-organization
leaders voiced strong criticism of the military's treatment of
the media. Subsequently, the representatives of these organizations
and the Pentagon worked together to develop the DOD Principles
for News Media Coverage of DOD Operations, which were published
in April 1992. [See Appendix IV, p. 197.] This document simply
highlighted concepts and procedures which had been in other DOD
documents for many years, but in so doing it emphasized to military
commanders the importance of their personal involvement in planning
for news coverage of combat operations.
Lessons learned
Judging from conflict/crisis operations since Desert Storm, the
military has finally learned its lesson with regard to news-media
planning. The level of military/press cooperation in Somalia and
Haiti was unprecedented. In planning prior to the invasion of
Haiti, for instance, the Pentagon worked with news organizations
to structure a component of independent-coverage reporters who
were positioned for entry into the country immediately after the
DNMP.
It is noteworthy that there were few, if any, complaints from
the news media about their treatment by the military in Somalia
or Haiti. Interviews for this report with senior military commanders
indicate that they were personally involved in the media planning
for these operations. For example, Gen. J.H.Binford Peay, U.S.
Army, commander-in-chief of the U.S. Central Command, was interviewed
at the time his command was planning for extraction of United
Nations forces from Somalia, an event which occurred in March
1995. General Peay confirmed during his interview that he was
intimately involved in the public affairs planning for this operation.5
Interviews with both military and media representatives indicate
two primary areas in which military/news media planning and cooperation
can be further improved. First, Pentagon/military personnel must
have reasonable advance notice of the number of reporters who
will cover an operation in order to plan effectively for news
media support. Second, it is crucial to establish the optimal
number of reporters who will cover any given conflict or crisis.
In Desert Storm, the number of news personnel in the theater was
far in excess of what could be accommodated in the combat units,
creating a major problem. This led to establishment of the combat
pool system.
In applying lessons from past wars to the coverage of future conflicts,
it is particularly important to understand the nature of modern
warfare. U.S. armed forces today fight a closely coordinated sea-air-land
battle employing high-speed "maneuver warfare." In ground
war, for example, troops are transported in rapidly moving tanks
and armored personnel carriers and helicopters traveling at 150
mph or more. Furthermore, over the years the military has developed
the capability to fight effectively at night. No foreign military
possesses a similar night-fighting capability, so American forces
will fully exploit this advantage in combat. Future U.S. military
operations will normally commence at night and continue around
the clock.
The only realistic way for the news media to cover modern warfare
is for reporters to be positioned in and travel with military
units, preferably as soon as the action starts. It will be impossible
to achieve comprehensive, effective coverage of future combat
with reporters striking out on their own, trying to cover battles
such as those in Desert Storm, ranging over vast distances in
rugged terrain at night and in bad weather.
Reporters moving randomly on the battlefield in locations unknown
to both friendly and enemy forces are at great risk of getting
lost, killed or captured. In addition, such situations jeopardize
the effectiveness of U.S. forces by increasing the already high
level of complexity and confusion in combat. Mistaking American
reporters for the enemy-or mistaking the enemy for American reporters-obviously
could have tragic consequences.
These considerations, as well as the others here noted, lead the
authors of this report to propose an "independent coverage
tier concept"-fully described in Chapter 9 [pp. 57-62]-which
will improve the ability of the news media to plan effectively
for coverage of future wars.
Endnotes
1. Joint Operations Planning and Execution
System (Joint Pub 5-03.2), Annex F. Washington, D.C.: Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). March 1992.
2. Lawrence Eagleburger, telephone conversation
with Frank Aukofer, May 22, 1995.
3. Maj. Gen. Winant Sidle, USA (Ret.), Final
Report of the CJCS Media-Military Relations Panel, August
23, 1984.
4. Fred S. Hoffman, Review of Panama Pool
Deployment, December 1989, report, March 1990.
5. Gen. J.H.Binford Peay III, interview by authors,
Tampa, Fla., January 23, 1995.
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