

*Diffusion of Democracy*  
**Final Project Report**

Version 7  
12/15/99

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
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## Origins of the Project

This project originated as a pedagogical experiment. In January 1996, Lehigh's College of Arts and Sciences received a grant from the Hewlett Foundation to add research activities and other participatory learning to lower division courses. In the fall of 1997, Moon developed a "side-bar seminar", International Relations 96, attached to courses in American Foreign Policy and International Political Economy. Little progress was made owing to the limited time available (one hour per week) and the very limited background of the eight students, most freshman and none IR majors.

The experiment was renewed in Fall 1999 with International Relations 127, Research in International Relations with a select group of five students, most upper-division International Relations majors. Most of this report will concern the research elements of the project rather than its pedagogical role. Appendix One ("Origins") contains the original proposal, the syllabus for IR 96, and the syllabus for IR 127.

## Project Description

### **Problem statement: *Does trade lead to democracy?***

The question, "Does trade lead to democracy?" arises from several theoretical currents and acquires policy relevance in relation to several contemporary issues. However, the voluminous theoretical literature on democratization provides no compelling account of why trade should be an important causal factor and the limited empirical literature fails to establish its importance within the complex causal dynamic of evolving political institutions. The mission of this project is to adjudicate alternative theoretical claims about this causal linkage and explore the policy implications that follow from our empirical findings.

### **Project goals**

In practice, two sets of parallel goals—one research-oriented, the other educational—have guided the enterprise. This report emphasizes the first.

The educational goals were three-fold. First, this experience acquainted students with the norms and practices of scientific research in international relations. Initially, this should deepen their understanding of the empirical research they encounter in their other course work, especially with respect to statistical reporting of theory testing. However, it was also designed more broadly to emphasize the role of epistemic communities in shaping expectations of work products, including those students will encounter after graduation in non-academic settings. Second, the project was designed to give students experience in working within teams centered around common communication

technologies, another imperative in the contemporary era. A third goal was to transfer both the joy of discovery and the skills of research, thus preparing students to conduct research projects of their own in the future.<sup>1</sup>

The ultimate research goal was to produce a manuscript that advanced the existing empirical and theoretical literature on democratization, especially with respect to the effect of trade. The guiding aspiration was a paper worthy of publication in a scholarly journal. Furthermore, other project documents and products should contribute to further study of related theoretical and policy issues. Several intermediate steps and proximate goals were more attainable yet worthy targets in their own right.

To make a contribution to the study of democracy (and the role of trade in affecting its course) will require that we produce the following:

- an interpretative survey of the literature that describes the current state of the art with respect to theory and evidence while also identifying weaknesses in that body of literature,
- an alternative theory that corrects some or all of those weaknesses,
- a research design capable of validating previous state-of-the-art findings as well as evaluating our alternative theory.
- a data set that can be used to test relevant theory.
- data analysis that evaluates our alternative theory.

It must be recognized that the above goals are ambitious ones and the seminar approach used to meet them is experimental. None of the associate investigators have training in quantitative methods, experience in large-scale research, or previous knowledge of this substantive topic. Therefore, a final project report that lays the groundwork for future work in this area represents a considerable achievement.

## Processes

The seminar met twice a week for the fall semester 1999. Most of the work was performed between sessions by the investigators, with the resulting documents uploaded to a common web-based site for distribution. Seminar sessions were devoted to instruction and review of these documents, which were continually revised by different investigators.

With the goal of formulating and evaluating a relevant theory, the seminar began with several sessions devoted to the International Futures (IFs) computer simulation (Hughes, 1999). IFs illustrated what a formal theory looks like and how the epistemic community of quantitative International Relations

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<sup>1</sup> Three of the five are now engaged in research projects for College Scholar and/or departmental honors.

researchers conceive the demonstration of systematic knowledge of social processes. We used the IFs model of several global problems (such as overpopulation and pollution) to elucidate the role of formal theory in guiding policy, by identifying the variables that could be manipulated in order to alleviate those problems.

Properly motivated to formulate a theoretically-grounded, empirically-testable, and policy-relevant hypothesis, we read two pieces on general social science methodology (Stinchcombe, 1968; Van Evera, n.d.) and five core articles chosen by the principal investigator on the basis of previous research, one by each student. Each contained a theoretical treatment of democratization and a statistical estimation of resulting hypotheses. We discussed the differences between case study research and statistical research, considering the advantages and shortcomings of each. Emphasizing the statistical approach, we reviewed its basic building blocks: general theory, variables, operational measures, hypotheses, and equation estimation. With both the model articles and the methodological primers in mind, we identified the attributes that demarcate a “good theory” and the components of a “good journal article”, the accepted form for communicating research results in this community.

We adopted the general goal of finding an explanation for the emergence of democratic systems, with a working hypothesis of a specific postulated cause, the linkage between increased trade levels and democracy that has informed recent U.S. foreign policy, especially toward China. Several sources of potential insights into democratization processes were then considered, with each pursued in parallel with the others. The result of these investigations are reported in sections below: existing theoretical and empirical literature, policy pronouncements, preliminary data analysis, original diffusion theory, and case analysis.

Of these tracks, mastering “the literature” was clearly assigned the highest priority. Each member was assigned to read and summarize several journal articles and books that examined various aspects of democracy and its possible causes. The summaries, arranged in a (more or less) common format, were posted on the class web page so that each member had access to all summaries. Many of these are contained in Appendix Two, Summary Documents. The process of building the bibliography was iterative. The backward search began with the major theoretical citations of each core article, identified in the summaries. The forward search utilized the Social Science Citation Index to identify more recent work informed by our core. We identified the dominant paradigm in the literature as “modernization theory”, which stresses the linkage between economic growth and democracy via growth-induced social change (Lipset, 1959). Early in this process, a literature review essay was begun, successively revised and extended by each member in turn as more literature came to light. A shortened form of the final review is found below.

The empirical literature revealed that various factors had been included in equations designed to “predict” the democracy levels of nations across time and space. An early version of attempts to test the modernization prediction (Jackman, 1973), was examined to reiterate the components of a good article and to establish the dual criteria of theoretical power and “goodness of fit”. This guided us in our efforts to identify weaknesses in the literature and to carve out a contribution we could make in advancing it. We noted that trade was sometimes mentioned as a causal factor--usually as an indirect influence--but had seldom been tested.

The group was surprisingly unsuccessful in its attempt to find explicit policy pronouncements that

link trade openness to democracy. American foreign policy pursues both the promotion of trade and of democracy. Although the two policies may be complimentary, the group could not establish any claim of the reason for expecting a cause and effect relationship between the two. Clearly, policy makers do not know if trade promotes democracy. A brief essay exploring policy makers implicit beliefs is included below.

To understand the elementary facts of democratization processes, we undertook a preliminary univariate analysis of democracy, as conceived and measured by the influential data construction project of Jagers and Gurr (1995). That report is included below. We hoped that we would be inspired to postulate additional determinants of democracy and identify appropriate research designs for recognizing them by observing where and when democracy has arisen as well as how often major and minor changes in political systems have occurred. We also compared this Polity III data to the leading alternative, the compilation by Freedom House (Gastil, et. al, various years).

This caused us to revisit the conception of democracy and techniques for measuring it, with a brief digression into more general issues of nominal and operational definitions and the effect of alternative codings on research results. Our report on defining and measuring democracy is included below. To expand appreciation for the challenges of data coding, we undertook one major data collection effort, establishing the origins of each of the 162 polities included in our sample. We coded each for date of independence, colonial master or predecessor polity, and the level of democracy of that prior polity. The ensuing (lively) discussion culminated in a codebook that established coding rules, contained in Appendix Three, Data. We also updated a prior data collection that recorded the contiguity among nations and compiled (but did not code) data on ethnicity, religion, and language, also contained in Appendix Three.

We also examined ten case studies of democratization, with each group member reading and summarizing two cases from Diamond's 1985 study. Most of those summaries are included in Appendix Two, Summary Documents. These case studies--Brazil, Chile, Turkey, India, Senegal, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, South Korea, Thailand, and Mexico-- provide depth not revealed by statistics. They also permitted a comparison between narrative reports and the quantitative codings mentioned above. While some cases, such as those of South Korea and Thailand provided support for modernization theory, other cases, such as that of India, negated it. Case study examination led the group to speculate about the effect colonialism has had on democracy levels. It was observed that democracy levels are higher in those countries that have been colonized by countries with high democracy levels, especially Great Britain). This is the insight that led the group to code each country according to its colonial power. The essay, like the others continuously revised and extended by each member in turn, is included below.

Finally, we considered diffusion theory as an organizing device for conceiving external effects on democratization, eventually selecting for analysis the democracy level of the colonial power, as well as the average democracy level of neighboring countries, and a trade-weighted average of the democracy level of trade partners. Procedures are documented in Appendix Three, Data.

## **Accomplishments**

The group did not achieve a publishable journal article, but this report and various associated documents do comprise an excellent base upon which to construct such a paper. Specifically,

- < The literature review is an excellent introduction for future researchers.
- < The group created and continually updated a bibliography of relevant books and articles that can guide future researchers. Furthermore, they compiled a bibliography of items that *appeared* to be relevant, but were found not useful to our project. This will save future researchers time.
- < The summaries of each article, designed to facilitate communication among the group, will also enable other researchers to quickly acquire a basic orientation to the literature.
- < The essay on the definition and measurement of democracy will be useful to future researchers.
- < The insights from cases and diffusion theory may inspire others.
- < The data needed to execute several relevant research designs is basically complete. Additional data on religion, language, and ethnicity is ready to be coded at a later date.

Furthermore, students acquired considerable knowledge about democratization and social science research and also learned a number of valuable skills,

- < Students became familiar with the concepts and theories of democracy, through readings of the different schools of thought.
- < The group learned how to utilize the Social Science Citation Index to track a literature and to find relevant articles by author and date.
- < The group learned about statistics and how to study data to find common trends. This was important because the group had no prior knowledge of the statistical techniques used in this literature.
- < The group learned about writing summaries, surveys, and reports, especially in a group setting where each draft was reviewed in class by the group as a whole until agreement was reached on the content and grammatical form of the final draft.
- < The final accomplishment for the class was deciding the content of the final project report, which will be posted on a web page.

### **Tasks left undone**

- < The literature review emphasizes modernization theory, but does not adequately treat the empirical literature nor the dependency literature and globalization critics who suggest a negative relationship between trade and democracy.
- < The definition and measurement of key concepts is incomplete. Democracy is done, but development is not. Colonial effects and predecessor polities are incomplete.
- < A research design was neither chosen nor executed.



## Literature review

Scholars since the time of Locke and Rousseau have debated both the merits of, and the means to, a democratic system of governance. The most significant rebuttal of liberal democratic theory came from the pen of Karl Marx, whose concept of communism fueled a deluge of non-democratic revolutions in the twentieth century. In more recent years, academics have engaged in a far subtler, yet no less important, debate about the mechanisms that cause the development of democracy. As is the case with Waltz's realism in international politics, theories of democratic development focus on one main school of thought, modernization theory, which has engendered a number of opposing theories.

That primary school, first articulated by Seymour Martin Lipset, views democracy as an outgrowth of economic modernization (Lipset 1994, pg.1). Specifically, modernization theory argues that democratization is the final stage of a larger universal process whereby the interaction of the economy, society, and polity produce a gradual specialization and differentiation of the social structures necessary for the emergence of democracy (Huber et al, 93 [I think]). Przeworski and Limongi present the classic conception of modernization theory,

A story told about country after country is that as they develop, social structure becomes complex, labor processes begin to require the active cooperation of employees, and new groups emerge and organize. As a result, the system can no longer be run by command: the society is too complex...and dictatorial forms of control lose their effectiveness. Various groups, whether the bourgeoisie, workers, or just the amorphous 'civil society', rise against the dictatorial regime, and it falls. (Przeworski & Limongi 1997, pg. 156)

Most nineteenth century political theorists placed special emphasis upon the relationship between a market economy and democracy, a crucial aspect of modernization theory especially as it relates to class development. Lipset argues that a free-market economy with a large, independent peasant or lower class produces a bourgeoisie or middle class that can effectively challenge the autonomy of the state and demand significant democratic reforms (Lipset 1994, 2). Huber, Rueschmeyer and Stephens concentrate specifically on the development of class structure and power distribution within social groups. Stephens specifically validates the link between economic growth, changes in class structures, and democracy:

Capitalist development is associated with the rise of democracy in part because it is associated with a transformation of the class structure strengthening the working class. (Lipset 1994, 2)

Dominguez further supports this line of thinking, affirming that free markets lead toward democracy (and vice versa).

Even Lipset admits that there are limits to his modernization theory, since he studies other influences on democratization, such as colonial policies (Lipset 94). Experts such as Gasiorowski and Diamond subscribe to a "consolidation theory," in which trade is by no means a precursor to democracy, but instead is an element increasing the durability of a democracy, making such polities unlikely to regress.

Some scholars argue that there is a connection between the level of economic prosperity and

democracy, but that democratization is not a necessary outgrowth of economic development or modernization. A pioneer of this school was Barrington Moore, whose 1966 book *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* contained the first serious challenge to the Lipset school. The theoretical keystone for these scholars is that capitalist democracy resulted from a unique combination of environment, catalyst, and impetus; an historical “moment.” It is extremely unlikely that all of these factors will again combine to facilitate a Third-World democratization wave.

Critics of modernization theory argue that democratization, if possible, is a function of holistic development, not simply trade. They believe that there is no simple formula for democracy; again, Western democratization was time-specific. As such, social structure, economy, and, as a result, polity in developing states will diverge from the Western standard. Indeed, if there is an attempt to strictly adhere to the Western example, the end result may actually be negative.

Another branch of theorists focuses on the external influences on democratization. Starr reapplies the infamous Acheson domino theory to democracy, noting a diffusion of liberal principles throughout the world. Halperin also focuses on external influences, postulating a “guarantee clause,” in which active intervention opposes threats to democracy.

World systems theory supports this external thinking as well. These scholars divide the globe into two realms, in which states are either in the periphery or the core. Periphery states support the elevated position of the core states with the fruits of their labor and at the cost of their own prosperity. Many of these scholars argue that trade adversely affects global democratization, as its consequences for states in the periphery are often damaging. As such, world systems theory advocates “homegrown” democratization with an emphasis on development.

Despite the great academic strides made in understanding the process of democratization, there are still issues surrounding the concept that require further study. Globalization and its effects on the state, and as a result, democratization and development, need to be addressed more fully than has been the case in the current literature. It also remains somewhat unclear just what specific developments in civil society lead to democracy. Furthermore, understanding the role of the state and other domestic actors in many of these theories remains somewhat vague.

A brief examination of democratic theory reveals that different groups advocate distinct, and sometimes contradictory, paths to democratic development. Each route, whether internal, external or other, has a wealth of academic knowledge and scholarly research to demonstrate its validity. Perhaps then this process is viewed best as a growing tree, rather than as any specific path, with numerous branches sprawling out towards the fruit of democracy.

## **Definition and measurement of key concepts**

It is our way of using the words “democracy” and “democratic government” that brings about the greatest confusion. Unless these words are clearly defined and their definition agreed upon, people will live in an inextricable confusion of ideas, much to the advantage of demagogues and despots.--Alexis de Tocqueville

### **Defining and Coding Democracy**

In order to conduct a comprehensive study of democracy it is necessary to have a working definition of the term. However, despite the abundance of literature on the subject of democracy and democratization, there is no consensus of opinion as to what comprises a democratic regime. Several attempts to identify the common criteria necessary to evaluate the level of democratization within a country have been made, to varying degrees of success, but none of these efforts have overcome the intellectual stumbling blocks that plague such a task. Moreover, the existence of a large number of studies utilizing a myriad of indicators to code countries according to their democratic or non-democratic practices has sabotaged any attempt to extract vital knowledge from the comparison of individual efforts.

Most of these studies develop a set of criteria that are deemed the necessary components of democracy, and, once agreed upon, a country is measured against these criteria to determine its type of regime. Although this seems a logical and scientific process, the problem lies in the fact that each author's study relies upon a slightly different set of criteria. For instance, Lipset's famous study of this subject defined democracy as "a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials". (Lipset 59, p.1) Moreover, some definitions are broad, such as those used by Jagers and Gurr, (95, p.1) who state that "democracy is a system in which no one can choose himself, no one can invest himself with the power to rule, and therefore, no one can abrogate to himself unconditional and unlimited power." Others are highly specific, such as the definition of Gasiorowski (1998),

"Democracy is a political regime that A) has meaningful and extensive competition for positions of government, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force. B) Highly inclusive level of political participation exists in the selection of leaders and policies. C) Sufficient level of civil and political liberties exists. In short the existence of universal elections.

The elusive nature of defining democracy can also lead an author to change his definition from one study to the next. Indeed, Lipset's 1994 study of democracy utilizes a different definition than its predecessor from 1959. For the former, Lipset used Schumpeter's definition, which stated "democracy is an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (Lipset 94, p.1). Another recent study of democracy, *The Third Wave*, also relies on Schumpeter's 1942 "classical theory of democracy," synthesizing it as "[the polity's] most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all of the adult population is eligible to vote" (Huntington, 1991, p. 7).

Despite these inconsistencies, some common trends exist among the many definitions of democracy, such as the necessity of free and regular elections. Another aspect is that changes of those in power are necessary if there is to be democracy. This means that stability is not enough to make a country democratic (Diamond et al). Yet another view is that of Bollen (?), who sees democracy in terms of the minimizing of power of the non-elites, and the maximizing of power of the elites. One of the latest studies believes that decisional constraints upon the chief executive are important, but not as central as in the paradigm proposed by Jagers and Gurr (Gleditsch).

John O'Loughlin, in a recent study (1998), combines many aspects of the above definitions, using four criteria to judge relative democracy including: constraints on executive decision-makers of a polity; the extent of competition among political forces; the regulation of political participation; and the level of openness of recruitment into the decision-making bodies.

A more strict, non-quantifiable, definition can be found in (Huber, Rueschmeyer, et al 1993).

Regular free and fair elections of representatives on the basis of universal suffrage, with responsibility of the state apparatus to those elected representatives, including guarantees of freedom of expression and association.

Giovanni Sartori reminds us that democracy is a multifaceted concept, including political democracy; that is, the institutional electoral process; and social democracy, democracy as a state of society, of equality, rather than a political form. (1987, p.8-9) It may well be the case that an imbalance or lack of one of these separate but complementary concepts leads, in some cases, to the failure of a polity.

As demonstrated, it is extraordinarily difficult to lay out just what elements make up a "democracy." This is especially true when one must quantify one's definitions in the course of a study. For example, it is quite daunting to apply a number to how "fair" an election is. Indeed, it is often the case that experts will disagree on whether or not a given case can be classified as a democracy. For instance, states with nominally democratic institutions are often classified as democratic despite the disenfranchisement of the majority of the population. Other troublesome cases deal with the relative efficacy, stability, and sincerity of institutions. Methods of accounting for such discrepancies have developed over the years, as the study matures.

Jackman made one of the first attempts at quantifying democratic performance as a result of economic growth; he used voting ratios, competitiveness of parties, electoral irregularity, and freedom of the press. Since Jackman's work there have been numerous other studies. One particular study that has become a base for many others is the Freedom House Survey (Gastil), which used 'checklists' to rate countries as Free, Partly-Free, or Non-Free. The study attempts to set a universal standard for countries, which emphasizes the importance of democracy and freedom. In the study, democracy is characterized as "a political system in which the people choose their authoritative leaders freely from among competing groups and individuals who were not designated by the government." Its other main component, freedom, is defined as "the opportunity to act spontaneously in a variety of fields outside the control of the government and other centers of potential domination." With these two concepts as its basis, the Freedom House Survey compiles its final ratings by evaluating a country's scores from two checklists on political rights and civil liberties. Each country receives a numerical score, which is then compared to a ratings scale of Free, Partly-Free, or Non-Free.

Another renowned study came from Jagers and Gurr, who revised two earlier studies in order to develop a more sophisticated system, which measured annual indicators of institutional democracy and autocracy. The first study, the Polity I data set, used five criteria to determine a country's regime type, regime coherence, and regime durability. Gurr's 1974 Polity I data set was expanded from five indicators to nine for the Polity II data set, but the author's still determined their findings insufficient. The final data set, Polity III, attempted to rectify the shortcomings of these two previous efforts. The

Polity III data set “consists of annual democracy and autocracy indicators for 1946 through 1994 for all independent countries with populations greater than 500,000 in the early 1990s. The Polity III data, which will be combined with the pre-1946 authority characteristics and regime type data found in Polity II, encompasses 161 countries that were independent during all or part of the post-1945 period, 157 of which were in existence in 1994.”

Jagers and Gurr find three essential elements of democracies. The first element is the existence of “institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative political parties and leaders.” The second emphasizes the “existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of executive power.” The final component is the “guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation.” Combined with some selective corrections of the Polity II data set, the Polity III data set represents the culmination of 21 years of research and testing on the subject of democracy.

Another example of definitions and quantifications in studies can be drawn from Feng and Zak. They differentiate between democracies and autocracies by the relative need for the populace to resort to mass demonstrations in order to affect changes in the government. In a democracy, there is no need for mass demonstration because sufficient agents and institutions exist that address the desires of its citizens without the occurrence of violence.

New studies are developing their own measures for quantifying democracy. These newer methods are somewhat more polished and unambiguous than historical studies. For instance, Zehra Arat uses three indicators of democracy; the first being composed of ratings of legislative selection, effectiveness, and competitiveness of nominations; the second being composed of party legitimacy and party effectiveness; and the final quantifier being determined from the number of government sanctions on incidents of social unrest, termed the measure of government coerciveness. Arat further generates a measure of democratic instability in order to “identify patterns of oscillation” (Arat 30). This useful statistic is the sum of the absolute values of the changes in democracy divided by the time period in which the changes occurred.

$$[(|d_1| + |d_2| + \dots + |d_x|) / (t)]$$

This is useful in time series analysis, as the degree of change from democracy to autocracy over time can be observed.

One weakness of these definitional/coding schemes lies in the inherent tension between two goals of the enterprise. On the one hand, it is desirable to define and operationalize democracy broadly enough to capture those of its attributes that make it a desirable form of government. After all, democracy has become a target of theoretical and empirical study in large part so that we can better understand how to bring it about. If it were defined narrowly—purely in institutional terms without regard to its actual performance, for example—our conclusions concerning its determinants may well be regarded as irrelevant to the mission of bettering the human condition through improving the quality of governance. Advocates of this viewpoint, which mandates that issues of justice, equality, efficiency, and stability be incorporated into the definition and coding, are particularly alarmed that countries ranked low in human rights standards can still be categorized as a democracy.

On the other hand, democracy must be defined narrowly enough to permit scientific analysis and to guide practitioners. This mission mandates an analytic separation of various properties of political

systems so that the causal connections among them, if any, can be determined by empirical analysis (rather than being assumed by ideologically-grounded definitions). For example, separating human rights from democratic institutions allows us to examine whether the former is guaranteed by the latter, the answer to which might cause us to readjust the target of our proposals for political change.

A second difficulty stems from the asymmetry between our multi-dimensional understanding of democracy and our uni-dimensional coding of it. Creating an index of democracy by adding together its components seems appropriate because these various dimensions, described above, are broadly collinear if nevertheless distinct. Furthermore, the polar ends of our coding continuum are defined by nations possessing either all or none of the elements associated with our ideal conception of democracy. Thus, it is quite easy to correctly identify the purest democracies or autocracies. However, it is much harder to classify states with qualities of both, and especially difficult to rank those with severely contrasting attributes on the various dimensions of democracy. South Africa under apartheid represents an especially challenging case: It had political institutions that in most respects were indistinguishable from those of nations with perfect scores on all democracy ratings, yet they applied to a tiny percentage of the citizenry. On the other hand, the political system of Mexico was far more inclusive, yet lacked other democratic forms, such as elections that were truly competitive.

The relative ranking of such cases is troublesome for research designs that seek to predict the level of democracy at a given point in time. However, because such cases are assigned intermediate values on all democracy scales and because most variance-based estimation techniques are more strongly affected by extreme scores, their actual effect on statistical results tend to be minimal. The effect is much more critical for those designs that emphasize political change. Should one regard a change from apartheid to a Mexican-style political system as a movement toward or away from democracy? Some analysts, such as Przeworski and Limongi (1997), duck the problem by collapsing a continuous scale of democracy into two or three discrete categories, which always include "coherent democracies" and "coherent autocracies" and sometimes an intermediate category of "incoherent polities". This approach simplifies the analysis considerably, especially because about three-quarters of cases fall into the extreme categories (see Project document "What does democratization look like?"). [This is another reason that intermediate cases are not very influential in analyses that predict levels of democracy.] However, this simplicity comes at the expense of diminished relevance, because small changes are so much more common than large ones. For example, our sample shows only 35 cases in which a nation has moved in one year 14 or more points on the 21 point democracy scale of Jagers and Gurr, the minimum movement required to go from one coherent category to the other. By contrast, 165 nations moved only a single point and 264 moved more than 1 but less than 14.

Of course, to gauge whether these changes are appropriate targets of analysis and to ascertain how important each dimension is relative to others ultimately requires an empirical analysis that cannot begin until these issues are resolved, at least temporarily. In practice, a movement or difference is worthy of attention to the degree that it predicts future changes that are larger and more significant. It would be interesting to know, for example, the future trajectory of a nation that experiences a single point improvement in democracy. Is it more or less likely that the next change is also toward democracy? Further, is it more likely that apartheid-style systems will broaden the franchise or that one-party states will become more competitive? Definitions, whether nominal or operational, must always be rooted in a



theoretical perspective, an awkward sequencing since theories cannot be tested until concepts are defined.

## Insights from cases

Democracy is an historically unnatural system of government in that it demands that its leaders place limitations on their own powers. Why democracy is the dominant government in the international system is the focus of many competing theories. These theories attempt to explain the reasons why democracies emerge, but large gaps in our understanding persist. Indeed, it remains unclear what factors lead to the creation of a credible, sustainable democracy. Case studies can be of pivotal importance when considering the underlying causes of democratic successes and failure. Moreover, while theories speculate as to which factors lead to the emergence of democracy, case studies can shed light on factors that have led to democracy in the past for specific countries. Modernization Theory (Lipset), which emphasizes the importance of economic growth leading to changes in class structure and eventually to democracy, is the dominant paradigm. There are other theories that support different factors as prerequisites to democracy. While some cases, such as those of Thailand, South Korea, and Brazil provide support for Modernization Theory, other cases, such as those of India, Turkey and Chile, negate it. A brief historical overview of each of these cases will show the differences of democratic emergence and sustainability in each country. Our goal is to find trends that help us to understand the phenomenon of democracy.

In Thailand, rapid economic growth is continues to produce social forces, which support democratization. There is an expanding autonomous (and increasingly political conscious) entrepreneurial and professional middle class and a movement of labor into manufacturing (furthering the differentiation and organization of the urban sector). Furthermore there have been improvements in literacy, education, and communication; changes that have both increased the proportion of the population desiring political liberalization and drawn Thailand into contact with advanced, industrialized nations. These changes have also enhanced the skills necessary for people to pursue their own interests. To achieve economic growth, Thailand has adopted conservative economic policies, with a particular emphasis on export promotion. Emphasis has also been placed on controlling inflation, fiscal deficits, and foreign borrowing. Although problems of corruption have arisen, Thailand has achieved a level of economic growth conducive to its democratic stability.

South Korea is undergoing rapid political transformation after four decades of primarily authoritarian rule. Factors promoting democratization in South Korea include democratic socialization among a highly literate populace, and the growth of the middle class whose members are becoming more assertive about continued economic growth and expanded political rights. Other forces pushing for democratization included anger about the high costs of repression, South Korea's rising international status as a result of its economic expansion, and it Seoul's new alliance with the US. The expansion of the middle class, according to modernization theory, is a prerequisite for democracy. The middle class must be secure to challenge the state and to demand reforms.

Economic growth is the underlying force behind the social changes that have led to democratization.

South Korea has moved from being an underdeveloped, low-income country, to being a newly industrialized country. Democracy has faced, and will continue to face many difficulties. The public is eager to achieve progress in democratization although it is sometimes a slow and socioeconomically costly process.

What happens to the policies of a modernizing society is determined, in many ways, by the nature of the traditional society and by the means in which modernization has come about. Also the timing of the modernization process, the external environment and the ways in which socio-economic benefits are distributed effect a nation's policies.

A good example of the distribution dilemma is Brazil. In Brazil, protest and popular resistance have played an important role in bringing an end authoritarian rule after almost twenty years. This, however, was not the only factor in helping to bring about a change. Educated, urban-middle class civilians, believing that military-authoritarian rule achieved growth at an unacceptable cost, were also instrumental in helping to bring about this change. At the same time, Brazilian power holders showed flexibility in allowing the government to change from an authoritarian government to a democratic state, believing both sides would benefit greatly from this transition.

Successful elections with mostly democratic electoral rules and practices and self-restraint on the part of the military has allowed the elections to run smoothly with only minor manipulations. The Brazilian government has also been fairly impressive in constantly seeking to promote economic growth throughout the country since the change to democracy. Industrialization has been one of the key factors in helping the economy to grow. Brazil has relied heavily on its economic growth to prove its legitimacy in the world market. While Brazil's levels of income inequality and mass poverty remain among the world's highest levels, the country has taken significant steps in hopes of keeping the economy growing.

Although the cases of South Korea, Thailand, and Brazil provide support for the idea that the more economically advanced a country is, the more likely it will be to sustain a democratic system, as predicted by Modernization theory, a brief analysis of the cases of India and Chile negate this theory. The fact that India's system of government is democratic, and has sustained democracy for four decades despite poverty, ethnic diversity, and developmental problems, defies prominent theory. At the same time, Chile's economic growth has in its own way defied the Modernization theory.

Nationalism in India began with the idea that the Indians should overcome weaknesses within Indian society, such as in the organizations of religion and education. This had to be accomplished before any serious opposition movement against the colonial government could be undertaken. The focus was internal rather than external. The target of India's reforms and action was their own society, not their foreign rulers. During the early phases of Indian nationalism there was a consensus that the intervention of a democratic state was crucial for the development of industry, agriculture, and education. This served as a basis for democratic economic planning in the country.

Modernization theory argues that rapid economic growth and the expansion of social resources are vital elements to the sustainability of democracy. The case of India shows that democracy can be sustained despite a lack of economic growth. There have been gains in the industrial sector but the Indian economic performance has moved slower than the average rate for developing countries and for the world as a whole.



Turkey is another of the few countries that are more democratic politically than they ought to have been according to its level of socioeconomic development. It can be placed in the category of unstable democracies, especially because of its geographic location in the Middle East. The development of democracy has been linked to the actions of particular actors, and the commitment of the political establishment to the ideals of democracy and western thought. Also the military intervened to preserve the democratic order on several occasions, most recently in 1980. Even though there have been multiple coups and governments Turkey has maintained a seemingly democratic state. The democratization of Turkey appears to refute modernization theory since it has only achieved a developmental economic status. Although its growth rate has been significant recently, it is necessary that Turkish civil society grows in order to curb the dominance of the state. This growth will be the key to a continued consolidation of democracy.

Even though Chile has historically had a strong democratic system, its breakdown did not occur overnight. Besides the election of Salvador Allende to presidency, several factors played a role in the erosion of democracy in this country. Chile was transformed from an open and participatory political system to one of authoritarian rule with the collapse of democracy. Soon after the authoritarian regime took power over Chile, it was clear that they were not going to turn back to civilian leaders. They aimed to destroy the left and their collaboration, and to engineer a fundamental restructuring of the Chilean political institutions.

Among the people most profoundly affected by this change have been business groups. The change from a state supported, import-subsidizing industrialized country to an export-oriented economy with low tariff barriers and few government subsidies has changed business groups profoundly for the better. The authoritarian government soon gained powerful new supporters, even though they had little to no influence, from these successful businesses which flourished with the opening of Chile's economy to the world market. Even though the authoritarian government was objectionable to these businesses, it was a far preferable alternative to the uncertainties of democratic policies.

There are also examples of countries that show some of the signs of an emerging democracy but that have not fully achieved that status. Nigeria is such a case; it can be classified as a quasi-democracy, since independence it has faced fairly free democracy intermixed with military rule. Democracy has had a difficult time in Nigeria when there is a strong desire by the people for capable leadership and structure, in such times the military has taken over. Independence in 1960 saw the institution of an U.S.-based constitution with division of power and guarantees of political and civil rights. The political elites, however, remained uncommitted to fair play, rule of law, and tolerance. The 1983 elections in particular were tremendously fraudulent; a coup at that time was welcomed across the country. Another of the countless examples of overthrows in Nigeria is the coup of 1986, which saw the institution of economic reforms, but the clamps of repression were not loosened. It would certainly seem that economics played a major role in the desire to throw off military rule, but strictly Nigerian characteristics caused the failure of democracy. Ethnic tension, proneness to violence, and laughable corruption have led to a series of democratic pratfalls.

One more example of a country that has not been able to maintain a true democracy is Senegal. One might characterize Senegalese politicians as corrupt, self-interested, and prone to violence. In 1974 the government made initial reform measures, the goal of which was to create a "controlled

democracy". This system has persisted through the present day; the case diverges from many of the theories with which we are familiar because of its centralized form of government. Despite repression and poor economic results, the people have not attempted to change the system in any meaningful way. Senegal's centralized authoritarian government and lack of opposition has led to an interesting phenomenon, instead of economic or social development, there is bureaucratic development. The expansion of the bureaucracy results in even fewer ways to create change.

Mexico is a very unique example, in that it defies most forecasts for democracy, it remains a non-democratic society with few economic and political reforms. Mexico's history is authoritarian and its democratic precedents are small; independence in 1821 did not bring democracy or stability, this was caused by lack of economic growth. There was no redistribution of wealth, or inclusion of the Indian masses into the system. Along with its strong presidency, Mexico's centralization has been a major obstacle for democracy. This centralization is embodied by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI); it has held power longer than any other party in Latin America. There has been economic progress but it has been highly concentrated among the already wealthy and political classes. There is a strong probability of continued openness in Mexico that may lead to democracy, but the country lacks experience with democratic regimes. In the least the Mexican example shows that civilian rule and a stable regime are not the same as democracy.

Finally, there is the case of Zimbabwe, where there is still a debate centered on what type of democracy is good for the country. Zimbabwe was a British colony and at that time it was an oligarchy of whites with all the power and the African majority without any rights. An African nationalist movement began to develop, but its task was complicated by the fact that Zimbabwe has a plural society ethnically and racially. The system today is a competitive multiparty state with a single dominant party, but there are indications of a move toward a one-party system. Zimbabwe can be labeled as 'semi-democratic'; the regime is too young for any theoretical democratic studies. But the country has thus far been successful in maintaining democracy, there was in the early 1980's a severe recession in which the regime was not brought down. If it avoids moving to a one-party system and ethnic differences can be worked out through fair elections the picture is bright for Zimbabwe.

The study of individual countries' experiences with democracy shows that the emergence of democracy is a complex process. It is clear that prominent theory has not fully explored all the factors that can lead to democracy. The historical experience of a nation must be taken into account when assessing the likelihood of a sustainable democracy. Countries with democratic systems have taken paths that vary immensely. The case of India demonstrates that there are serious flaws in the dominant paradigm of Modernization and that Lipset's equation of economic growth and social change bringing about democracy may be too simplistic. Other factors of a more social and political nature must be taken into account, rather than focusing solely on economic factors. The study of individual nations' experiences with democracy is helpful in that it allows for the application of theory to reality, and allows us to see if a particular theory is viable outside of the hypothetical realm.

### **Insights from original diffusion theory**

Many scholars have recognized that the process of democratization appears to involve at least two discreet stages. In the first, democracy is *initiated* by the creation of institutional forms. In the second, democracy becomes firmly *established* as key actors in the system come to accept democratic norms of behavior, democratic processes are demonstrated to function, and stability in democratic operations becomes a common expectation.

The latter, sometimes referred to as democratic consolidation, has been the most common focus for theorists who postulate the structural conditions under which such a process can occur. Modernization theory exemplifies this approach although some of its proponents also portray the *initiation* of democracy as a response to structural conditions. Other theorists underplay this distinction and most quantitative tests of democratization theory ignore it altogether. Przeworski and Limongi (1997) are the most explicit in distinguishing these two stages, arguing that the common finding of a positive relationship between democracy and income, for example, is due entirely to the propensity of democratic systems to consolidate easily at higher levels of development. This process alone could account for the cross-sectional results, even if income had no effect whatsoever on the initiation of democracy. Indeed, Przeworski admits to ignorance on the sources of democratic initiation.

It seems a plausible working hypothesis that democratic consolidation is a process dominated largely by endogenous structural factors like class formation, urbanization, and industrialization. External factors, though present, seem distinctly secondary. Democratic initiation, however, seems much more likely to be influenced by external factors. It certainly occurs far more rapidly and discontinuously than would seem likely from internal growth processes, which are usually fairly incremental. Furthermore, the construction of democratic institutions and the stipulation of democratic processes is far more complex than usually acknowledged. External influences are important sources of information about how to construct, coordinate, and sequence these political innovations. How might these external influences be conceived?

Starr (1991, 1995) and O'Loughlin et. al. (1998) raise the possibility that diffusionary processes may be at work, observing that serial and spatial correlation seem to dominate the pattern of democratization. Not only does democratization seem to occur "in (temporal) waves", but it also occurs "in (spatial) clusters". Elementary diffusion processes could certainly account for such patterns as democratic ideas spread from one nation to a neighbor by day-to-day communication. However, we note that the analogy between institutional innovation and physical diffusion could be extended. Physical diffusion occurs at unequal rates through different media, across different barriers, and in the presence of different agents. So too, we postulate, do the contagion processes of democratization.

In fact, several diffusionary agents may play a role in speeding or slowing the pace at which democratic ideas are spread. Some known factors statistically associated with democratization may be conveniently lodged within this meta-framework. As a working hypothesis, we theorize that diffusion of institutional forms is especially facilitated by:

< the authoritative (and often violent) imposition characteristic of colonial relationships. That is, a

nation may be assumed to absorb the institutional forms and accompanying attitudes of a predecessor state, especially the colonial master, so that democracy (or the absence of it) diffuses from predecessor to successor regardless of physical distance.

- < the communication of ideas and policy leverage associated with trade relations, so that nations which trade principally with democracies absorb some measure of democracy, while those that trade principally with autocracies move in the opposite direction.
- < linguistic, religious, and ethnic ties, which are known to shape other aspects of behavior, so that when one nation moves toward democracy, others with similar cultural characteristics are likely to be influenced in the same direction, again regardless of physical distance.

Thus, we prepare for analyses that examine colonial relations, trade relations, and various ethnic ties.

### **Insights from policy arguments: the interaction between trade and democracy**

The idea that the United States can benefit from and should actively pursue the spread of democracy has been a cornerstone of American foreign policy since the onset of the Cold War. However, since the fall of the Soviet Union, the idea of democracy promotion has obtained a position of pre-eminence in Washington that is has never known. Indeed, in a recent article entitled "Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine", Douglas Brinkley acknowledges that the Clinton administration has attempted, with varying degrees of success, to make expanding the community of market democracies their presidential legacy. Al Gore during a radio address emphasized that the United States " must promote the growth of democracy and free markets around the world, because it's the right thing and the wise thing to do. Democracies are less likely to declare war on each other and they make better partners in trade and world affairs"(Jan 8 1994, Radio Address). While discussing the issue of trade with China, Republican presidential hopeful George W. Bush stated that "it is in our best interest to sell to the Chinese," and that "if we make China an enemy, they'll end up an enemy." Bush insisted that if the United States encourages Chinese entrepreneurs by expanding trade, "you'll be amazed at how soon democracy comes" in China (December 6, 1999 Election Debate).

The United States foreign policy pertaining to trade is embodied in the goals of the Chamber of Commerce. These goals are to open new markets and to promote free trade, these priorities serve the United State's economic interests abroad. Organizations such as this one are not necessarily concerned with the emergence and sustainability of democracy. Other agencies list among their highest priorities the spread of democracy around the world. The most notorious example of such a program is the National Endowment for Democracy, a government funded private agency created during the Reagan administration. Another agency is US AID (United States Agency for International Development) which states that " by promoting and assisting the growth of democracy the United States also supports the emergence and establishment of polities

that will become better trade partners and more stable governments" (<http://www.info.usaid.gov/democracy/>). Programs like US AID and NED have used the mechanism of aid to bring about democracy.

Support for these programs is widespread throughout the Washington bureaucracy, as Dana Rohrbacher's (R., California) comments concerning attempts to cut government funding for the National Endowment for Democracy demonstrate: "This is not about cutting government spending. This is about whether or not we are taking our commitment to democracy, freedom and human rights seriously. Whether those who long for freedom can look to us, not for a handout, but for leadership, for a commitment. If we vote to kill NED today, and tomorrow's world turns out to be haunted by despots and dictators, we will only have ourselves to blame." (Weyrich, Paul, pg.60)

However, other groups, such as the United States Chamber of Commerce, argue that the spread of liberal democracy is best achieved through trade and not aid. During a recent conference on the US Generalized System of Preferences Program, a representative of Senator Roth stated that knocking down trade barriers is essential to increasing liberalism on a global scale. Proponents of trade not aid believe that the foundation of a sound foreign policy, which includes democracy promotion as a goal, is found in a sound trade policy. The Clinton administration has exercised both avenues in pursuing democratic enlargement, but the administration's language seems to acknowledge that trade is the better option. Anthony Lake, Clinton's former National Security Advisor, highlighted four strategic points in the policy of democratic enlargement: to strengthen the community of market democracies; to foster and consolidate new democracies and market economies where possible; to counter aggression and support the liberalization of states hostile to democracy; and to help democracy and market economies take root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern.

Thomas Carrothers, an expert on democracy promotion, evaluates the administration's approach towards democratic enlargement as one that relies on sticks and carrots, using diplomatic and economic pressure and assistance programs to promote democracy. For Carrothers, the success of the administration's policy has been mixed. Carrothers argues that the ability of the US to spread democracy by any means is limited since it is not possible to change the political direction of a country through external means. Indeed, Carrothers states that democracy promotion, whether through trade or foreign aid, works best in countries that are already experiencing a democratic transition. In short, democracy promotion works best in countries where it is needed the least.

A firm link has not been established between the United State's efforts to promote free markets and to lower trade barriers, and the emergence of democracy. It is implied by the administration that such a link exists, but this remains unclear. The United States has also funded organizations that work to further other aspects of sustainable democracy such as, political, humanitarian and electoral rights. It is unclear if a casual relationship exists between trade and democracy, or which one precipitates the other. It is certain that both democracy and open trade can coexist, and policies of each complement one another.

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### Insights from preliminary data analysis: What does democratization look like?

An examination of some general patterns in the Democracy data may suggest the appropriate focus for our future research and writing. For example, does democratization tend to be a smooth, continuous, gradual process or a volatile, convoluted one? Should we focus upon the *introduction* of democracy or its *maintenance*? Is democratization the result of long-term causal processes or short-term ones? Is short-term change patterned or simply a “random walk”?

In short, what does democratization look like, statistically? More important, what kinds of forces could produce these kinds of patterns?

First, the sample. “Xdemocracy”, extracted from the Gurr data set, contains 21-point democracy data for 162 nations from 1946 to 1994. This will be trimmed in further analyses depending on needs. The Penn World Tables 5.6 data (GDP and openness) is the biggest constraint, running from 1950 to 1992, but the 1946-49 data provide the lags for change measures. Of the 162 nations, 20 of those have data for only a few years (4 or less), but the main analysis set will usually cover 140 nations with more than 15 data points. See June 30 DAYNOTES for details and <demodata.doc> for codebook and file creation procedures, with references to several Gurr pieces that describe the data.

#### Aggregate national experience

DEMO21			
Label	Value	Frequency	Pct
Transition	-88	91	1.6
Interregnum	-77	56	1.0
Interruption	-66	12	.2
	-10	210	3.8
	-9	613	11.1
	-8	210	3.8
	-7	1035	18.3
	-6	277	5.0
	-5	198	3.6
	-4	59	1.1
	-3	119	2.1
	-2	164	2.9
	-1	82	1.5
	0	43	.8
	1	51	.9
	2	75	1.4
	3	43	.8
	4	144	2.6
	5	97	1.8
	6	68	1.2
	7	136	2.5
	8	247	4.5

CHANGE: number of polity changes experienced by one coherent democracy

Value	Frequency	Pct
0	119	2.1
1	64	1.2
2	82	1.5
3	43	.8
4	51	.9
5	75	1.4
6	43	.8
7	144	2.6
8	97	1.8
9	68	1.2
10	136	2.5
11	247	4.5



One vision of democratization, seemingly implied by modernization theory’s claim that democratization occurs as a natural *consequence* of economic development or as one *component* of development itself (like Chenery and Syrquin’s “idealized facts” conception of development’s most well established sequences of economic and social conditions and events), is that of a natural, smooth progression of political system evolution. This clearly does not occur, as is evident from the analysis summarized in Explore4.wpd and repeated here. Of the 162 nations in the aggregate file created from XDIFFUSE, 140 offer a reasonably long time series (only 129 have Openness data). Some initial findings.

- < only 24 of those 140 have a single polity and unchanged political system over the entire sample period and two others (Japan and Italy) were unchanged after the transition polity immediately following World War II. What can we learn from those 26 nations marked by such political stability?

The vast majority (22 of those 26) are fully democratic (a perfect score of 10) -- the only exceptions being Saudi Arabia (-10), United Arab Emirates (-10), Libya (-7), and South Vietnam (-3 for 21 years). 18 of those 22 are OECD countries, except Costa Rica, Jamaica, Botswana, and Papua New Guinea.

- < 16 others have, at one time or another, reached a score of 10 but eight of these subsequently declined below 10.

South Korea achieved 10, then lost it, but had re-established full democracy by 1994, while the other 7 ended at a lower score, including Gambia twice (ending at -7) and Burma (-9) [also France, Czechoslovakia in 1948, Turkey thrice, Israel, and Malaysia]. The eight which retained the 10 without interruption after once achieving it include Brazil, Uruguay, Ireland, Portugal, Hungary, Greece, Mauritius, Cypress.

Furthermore, seven of those 16 also had transitional polities at one time or another and 13 of the 16 witnessed more than one polity transition.

- < Another way of putting it: in 1994, 31 nations were fully democratic, but that doesn’t mean that democratization was very frequent because 22 of them had been democratic since creation (or the early post-WW II period). 8 became democratic and stayed that way, one gained it, lost it, regained it. Meanwhile, 7 other nations had also achieved full democracy at one time or another, but lost it and had not regained it as of

MINDEM: minimum DEMO21 experienced among once coherent democracies

Value	Frequency	Percent
-10	2	2.5
-9	15	18.8
-8	5	6.3
-7	19	23.8
-6	1	1.3
-5	3	3.8
-3	2	2.5
-2	1	1.3
3	2	2.5
4	1	1.3
5	1	1.3
7	2	2.5
8	2	2.5
9	2	2.5

1994.

So, 38 nations had achieved the target democracy level of 10 at one time or another during the period for which data is available. What of the others? Well, 75% of the total sample had crossed into positive territory (DEMO21 >0) at least once. See table. That is, most had at least some experience with at least some democracy. The number of nations with no democratic experience at all is actually quite small - only 10 never moved above the -7 threshold of coherent autocracies. What does that tell us about what we should be seeking?

- < Among the remaining 102 nations, 42 reached a maximum of 7 or more on the 21 point scale at least once during this period. (Gurr regards a +7 or more as a "coherent" democracy, see source). That is, 80 of 140 -- nearly 60% - were once coherent democracies. Obviously, most had considerable experience with autocracy as well: half of them (41 of 80) had been a "coherent autocracy" (DEMO21 < -7).

NCHANGE among nations never a coherent democracy

Value	Frequency
0	4
1	3
2	15
3	17
4	8
5	3
6	5
7	3
8	1

The end point of this group gives cause for optimism. Only seven finished the period as coherent autocracies, while 67 finished as coherent democracies (including, of course, the 31 perfect 10's), leaving only 6 as incoherent (and presumably unstable) polities of mixed type. This group of 80 might make for an interesting analysis set.

This group also experienced considerable polity interruption (30 of 80 at least once), such as a transition regime between more permanent polities. They also experienced many polity changes - 30 of 80 had five or more polity changes. My initial reaction is that polity changes are more frequent than the image of a smooth rise of democracy suggests. Surprisingly, the picture doesn't change too much even among the 60

nations which had never achieved the status of coherent democracy. They had lower levels of democracy, to be sure, but they didn't appear much more unstable.

**How frequent are changes in a nation's level of democracy?**

**Maximum level of Democracy achieved during period**

Value	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative
-10	2	1.4	1.4
-8	1	.7	2.1
-7	7	5.0	7.1
-6	9	6.4	13.6
-5	4	2.9	16.4
-4	4	2.9	19.3
-3	3	2.1	21.4
-1	3	2.1	23.6
0	3	2.1	25.7
1	3	2.1	27.9
2	1	.7	28.6
3	3	2.1	30.7
4	2	1.4	32.1
5	5	3.6	35.7
6	10	7.1	42.9
7	8	5.7	48.6
8	21	15.0	63.6
9	13	9.3	72.9

**DEMO21**

Value Label	Value	Frequency
Transition	-88	91
Interregnum	-77	56
Interruption	-66	12
Total		5540



First, a note on coding the polity of nation-years. Not all nations in all years can be characterized as having a defined polity. Gurr codes many nation-years as an interruption, interregnum, or a transition regime.<sup>2</sup> See codebook and documentation.

Second, some mechanism was required in order to deal with such codes, which signify an absence of a “permanent” polity. It is undesirable to characterize these with a missing data code because the codes contain relevant information, but they cannot be analyzed as if they were real values on the DEMO21 variable either, particularly when DEMO21 is used to create a yearly change value (for replicating P & L among other purposes). As an intermediate step, I created a new variable (CHANGETP) for change type, which can be used to segregate cases involving these potentially misleading codes. Treating the above special codes as “gaps” in permanent polities, the polity change from any nation-year to the next can assume four types: from gap to gap, gap to polity, polity to gap or polity to polity. The variable CHANGETP expands that somewhat, by distinguishing in the polity-to-polity case between continuity or change, and in the gap-to-polity case between the origins of the new polity.

<b>CHANGETP</b> Type of regime change			
<u>Value Label</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Valid Percent</u>
Continued gap	-2	97	1.8
End polity	-1	60	1.1
Emerge from colony	1	56	1.0
Emerge from old unit	2	1	.0
Re-emerge from gap	3	61	1.1
Change	4	403	7.3
Continuation	5	4862	87.8
	Total	5540	100.0

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<sup>2</sup>I recoded some nation-years to treat transition regimes more consistently. The original data coded a nation-year with whatever “permanent” polity may have existed during that year, however briefly, thus ignoring any transition regime unless it existed for an entire calendar year. By using the newly-available Polity III data which records the exact date of regime and polity changes, I introduced a transition code whenever a transition regime existed for 12 consecutive months regardless of whether it coincides with a calendar year. See documentation.

How frequent are changes?  
 -- about 12.2% of all nation-  
 years show some type of polity  
 change. Clearly,  
 PRZEWORSKI and Limongi  
 are talking about much less  
 frequent change in their  
 discussion of democratization  
 and de-democratization. Are  
 their conclusions similarly  
 accurate when discussing this  
 more fine-grained political  
 change? Good question. A  
 replication is in order.

What are those changes?  
 Here are the frequency counts  
 for both the yearly values of  
 democracy and the change  
 variable. Following is a  
 summary of the national  
 experience of nations.

CHANGE						
Label	Value	Freq	Pct	Value	Freq	Pct
First year	-90	57	1.0		-1	73
Transition	-88	90	1.6	1.3		
Interregnum	-77	55	1.0			
Interruption	-66	12	.2			
	-19	1	.0			
	-18	1	.0			
	-17	1	.0			
	-15	5	.1			
	-14	6	.1			
	-13	3	.1			
	-12	4	.1			
	-11	6	.1			
	-10	6	.1			
	-9	10	.2			
	-8	5	.1			
	-7	17	.3			
	-6	5	.1			
	-5	13	.2			
	-4	8	.1			
	-4	8	.1			
	-3	17	.3			
	-2	31	.6			

ICPSR	YEARS		DEMO21						CHANGES				MD	GAPS	
	FIRST	LAST	N	BEG	END	MIN	MAX	AVG	MIN	MAX	++#	-			
2	United States	1947	1994	48	10	10	10	10	10.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
20	Canada	1947	1994	48	10	10	10	10	10.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
94	Costa Rica	1947	1994	48	10	10	10	10	10.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
200	United Kingdom	1947	1994	48	10	10	10	10	10.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
210	Netherlands	1947	1994	48	10	10	10	10	10.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
211	Belgium	1947	1994	48	10	10	10	10	10.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
212	Luxembourg	1947	1994	48	10	10	10	10	10.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
225	Switzerland	1947	1994	48	10	10	10	10	10.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
305	Austria	1947	1994	48	10	10	10	10	10.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
375	Finland	1947	1994	48	10	10	10	10	10.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
380	Sweden	1947	1994	48	10	10	10	10	10.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
385	Norway	1947	1994	48	10	10	10	10	10.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
390	Denmark	1947	1994	48	10	10	10	10	10.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
395	Iceland	1947	1994	48	10	10	10	10	10.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
900	Australia	1947	1994	48	10	10	10	10	10.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
920	New Zealand	1947	1994	48	10	10	10	10	10.00	0	0	0	0	0	0
260	West Germany	1949	1994	46	10	10	10	10	10.00	0	0	0	0	0	1
51	Jamaica	1959	1994	36	10	10	10	10	10.00	0	0	0	0	0	1
571	Botswana	1966	1994	29	10	10	10	10	10.00	0	0	0	0	0	1
910	Papua New Guinea	1976	1994	19	10	10	10	10	10.00	0	0	0	0	0	1

205	Ireland	1947	1994	48	8	10	8	10	9.79	0	2	1	0	0	0
666	Israel	1949	1994	46	10	9	9	10	9.39	-1	0	0	1	0	1
590	Mauritius	1968	1994	27	9	10	9	10	9.48	0	1	1	0	0	1
325	Italy/Sardinia	1947	1994	47	10	10	10	10	10.00	0	10	1	0	1	2
740	Japan	1947	1994	43	10	10	10	10	10.00	0	10	1	0	5	5
235	Portugal	1947	1994	46	-9	10	-9	10	-1.28	0	9	2	0	2	3
352	Cyprus	1960	1994	29	8	10	7	10	9.24	0	7	2	0	6	6
820	Malaysia	1957	1994	38	10	7	3	10	8.18	-7	5	1	2	0	1
420	Gambia	1965	1994	30	10	-7	-7	10	9.13	-17	1	1	2	0	1
220	France	1947	1994	48	10	8	5	10	7.92	-5	3	2	2	0	0
350	Greece	1947	1994	48	8	10	-7	10	4.38	-11	15	2	2	0	0
315	Czechoslovakia	1947	1992	45	10	8	-7	10	-5.60	-17	14	2	2	1	2
165	Uruguay	1947	1994	47	0	10	-8	10	3.53	-8	16	4	1	1	2
310	Hungary	1947	1994	46	-7	10	-7	10	-4.89	-7	10	3	2	2	4
775	Burma	1948	1994	47	8	-9	-9	10	-2.55	-14	2	2	5	0	1
732	South Korea	1948	1994	47	-6	10	-9	10	-3.40	-19	18	6	3	0	1
140	Brazil	1947	1994	47	7	10	-9	10	1.34	-9	12	5	4	1	2
640	Turkey	1947	1994	47	10	9	-5	10	6.74	-14	12	5	5	1	2
750	India	1950	1994	45	9	8	7	9	8.51	-2	1	1	1	0	1
52	Trinid & Tobago	1962	1994	33	8	8	8	9	8.18	-1	1	1	1	0	1
950	Fiji	1970	1994	25	9	4	-3	9	6.56	-12	7	1	1	0	1
432	Mali	1960	1994	34	-7	8	-7	9	-5.62	-1	9	1	1	1	3
230	Spain	1947	1994	45	-7	9	-7	9	-1.07	0	8	2	0	3	4
570	Lesotho	1966	1994	29	9	8	-9	9	-3.97	-18	15	2	1	0	1
100	Colombia	1947	1994	48	5	9	-5	9	5.23	-10	12	3	1	0	0
434	Benin	1960	1994	32	2	8	-7	9	-3.88	-7	9	2	3	3	5
101	Venezuela	1947	1994	48	-3	8	-3	9	5.46	-1	9	4	2	0	0
155	Chile	1947	1994	48	2	9	-7	9	1.23	-13	10	5	1	0	0
771	Bangladesh	1972	1994	23	8	9	-7	9	-1.74	-10	14	3	3	0	1
290	Poland	1947	1994	47	-7	8	-8	9	-5.13	-7	11	5	3	1	2
130	Ecudor	1947	1994	48	-1	9	-5	9	2.58	-5	14	4	5	0	0
436	Niger	1959	1994	34	-7	8	-7	8	-6.12	0	8	1	0	2	4
553	Malawi	1965	1994	30	-9	8	-9	8	-8.40	0	16	2	0	0	1
560	South Africa	1947	1994	47	4	8	4	8	4.15	0	8	2	0	1	2
712	Mongolia	1947	1994	48	-9	8	-9	8	-6.02	0	9	3	0	0	0
355	Bulgaria	1947	1994	48	-6	8	-7	8	-5.42	-6	15	1	2	0	1
580	Madagascar	1961	1994	33	1	8	-6	8	-3.36	-4	8	1	2	1	3
780	Sri Lanka	1948	1994	47	7	7	3	8	5.98	-3	4	2	2	0	1
482	Central African Rep.	1962	1994	33	-9	8	-9	8	-7.61	-2	16	3	1	0	1
365	Russia (USSR)	1947	1994	48	-9	8	-9	8	-5.77	0	8	5	0	0	0
625	Sudan	1954	1994	38	8	-7	-7	8	-2.47	-15	14	2	3	3	5
812	Laos	1954	1994	23	8	-7	-8	8	-5.91	-9	8	2	3	18	11
475	Nigeria	1960	1994	35	8	-7	-7	8	-2.37	-14	14	2	4	0	1
790	Nepal	1947	1994	47	-5	8	-10	8	-5.23	-12	10	4	2	1	2
840	Philippines	1947	1994	48	2	8	-9	8	1.06	-11	14	5	2	0	0
135	Peru	1947	1994	46	2	-2	-7	8	2.02	-12	7	5	2	2	3
160	Argentina	1947	1994	45	-9	8	-9	8	-1.82	-15	16	3	4	3	5
145	Bolivia	1947	1994	44	-5	8	-7	8	-1.16	-3	14	3	5	4	5
800	Thailand	1947	1994	43	-3	6	-7	8	-1.37	-15	8	5	3	5	8
92	El Salvador	1947	1994	41	-8	8	-8	8	-.34	-6	7	5	3	7	8
41	Haiti	1947	1994	43	-5	8	-10	8	-6.91	-15	15	4	6	5	6

770	Pakistan	1947	1994	48	-4	8	-7	8	.50	-15	12	8	4	0	1
830	Singapore	1959	1994	34	7	-2	-2	7	-.94	-2	0	0	1	2	4
520	Somalia	1960	1994	31	7	-7	-7	7	-2.94	-14	0	0	1	4	4
339	Albania	1947	1994	48	-9	7	-9	7	-7.79	0	10	2	0	0	0
150	Paraguay	1947	1994	48	-5	7	-9	7	-6.13	-4	13	4	1	0	0
42	Dominican Rep.	1947	1994	47	-9	6	-9	7	-1.40	-3	9	3	2	1	2
500	Uganda	1962	1994	29	7	-4	-7	7	-3.52	-7	3	2	3	4	7
652	Syria	1947	1994	45	5	-9	-9	7	-5.71	-12	14	2	5	3	4
95	Panama	1947	1994	48	-3	7	-8	7	-1.54	-11	15	5	4	0	0
713	TAIWAN	1949	1994	46	-8	6	-8	6	-6.35	0	12	3	0	0	1
551	Zambia	1964	1994	31	2	6	-9	6	-4.48	-9	15	1	2	0	1
404	Guinea-Bissau	1974	1994	21	-7	6	-8	6	-6.48	-1	12	2	1	0	1
541	Mozambique	1976	1994	19	-8	6	-8	6	-6.68	0	12	3	0	0	1
93	Nicaragua	1947	1994	46	-8	6	-8	6	-5.37	-5	7	2	1	2	3
110	Guyana	1966	1994	29	2	6	-7	6	-1.83	-7	13	1	3	0	1
811	Kampuchea	1949	1994	40	-7	6	-9	6	-6.90	-9	6	1	3	6	8
91	Honduras	1947	1994	47	-3	6	-3	6	.34	-1	4	5	1	1	2
451	Sierra Leone	1961	1994	34	6	-7	-7	6	-3.74	-13	9	2	5	0	1
452	Ghana	1960	1994	33	-8	-2	-9	6	-5.45	-13	13	3	4	2	5
660	Lebanon	1947	1994	34	2	-1	-1	5	2.00	-1	3	1	1	14	11
552	Zimbabwe	1947	1994	48	4	-6	-6	5	2.15	-7	1	1	2	0	0
439	Upper Volta	1960	1994	35	-7	-4	-7	5	-5.26	-12	9	4	1	0	1
581	Comoros	1975	1994	20	5	-1	-7	5	-3.05	-9	11	1	5	0	1
90	Guatemala	1947	1994	48	5	5	-7	5	-1.04	-8	10	5	7	0	0
360	Romania	1947	1994	47	-7	4	-8	4	-6.11	-7	12	1	2	1	2
484	Congo	1961	1994	33	4	4	-8	4	-5.70	-11	4	1	2	1	3
40	Cuba	1947	1994	43	3	-7	-9	3	-6.02	-9	0	0	2	5	6
850	Indonesia	1947	1994	48	2	-7	-7	3	-4.81	-4	1	1	5	0	0
663	Jordan	1947	1994	48	-10	3	-10	3	-7.63	-8	6	6	2	0	0
501	Kenya	1965	1994	30	2	-5	-7	2	-5.57	-4	2	2	4	0	1
615	Algeria	1963	1994	32	-8	-7	-9	1	-7.81	-8	10	1	2	0	1
651	Egypt	1947	1994	47	1	-5	-7	1	-5.43	-7	1	2	1	1	2
433	Senegal	1960	1994	33	-1	1	-7	1	-2.67	-7	4	3	1	2	4
572	Swaziland	1968	1994	27	0	-9	-10	0	-8.07	-10	1	1	1	0	1
516	Burundi	1961	1994	33	0	-7	-7	0	-6.15	-7	3	1	3	1	3
678	N Yemen (Sana)[Arab]	1947	1989	42	-6	-5	-6	0	-4.60	-6	6	2	4	1	2
630	Iran	1947	1994	46	-1	-7	-10	-1	-7.57	-10	4	1	2	2	3
530	Ethiopia	1947	1994	45	-9	-1	-9	-1	-8.27	-1	2	1	2	3	4
345	Socialist Yugoslavia	1947	1994	46	-7	-6	-7	-1	-6.13	-7	4	2	2	2	3
817	South Vietnam	1955	1975	21	-3	-3	-3	-3	-3.00	0	0	0	0	0	1
70	Mexico	1947	1994	48	-6	-3	-6	-3	-4.94	0	3	1	0	0	0
616	Tunisia	1959	1994	36	-9	-3	-9	-3	-7.86	-1	3	4	1	0	1
435	Mauritania	1961	1994	34	-4	-6	-7	-4	-6.74	-3	1	1	1	0	1
517	Rwanda	1960	1994	34	-5	-4	-7	-4	-6.06	-2	3	1	1	1	2
645	Iraq	1947	1994	48	-4	-9	-9	-4	-6.56	-2	0	0	3	0	0
600	Morocco	1947	1994	39	-5	-4	-9	-4	-6.15	-5	4	2	2	9	8
760	Bhutan	1947	1994	48	-6	-5	-6	-5	-5.38	0	1	1	0	0	0
461	Togo	1961	1994	32	-6	-5	-7	-5	-6.69	-5	0	0	2	2	4
710	China	1947	1994	48	-5	-7	-9	-5	-7.60	-3	1	2	2	0	0
680	S Yemen (Aden)[People]	1967	1989	23	-5	-7	-8	-5	-6.83	-1	1	1	3	0	1
510	Tanzania	1963	1994	32	-7	-6	-7	-6	-6.91	0	1	1	0	0	1

438	Guinea	1958	1994	37	-9	-6	-9	-6	-8.32	0	2	2	0	0	1
437	Ivory Coast	1960	1994	35	-9	-6	-9	-6	-8.69	0	2	2	0	0	1
540	Angola	1975	1994	20	-7	-7	-7	-6	-6.90	-1	1	1	1	0	1
698	Oman	1947	1994	46	-6	-9	-10	-6	-9.07	-10	1	1	1	2	3
481	Gabon	1961	1994	33	-7	-6	-9	-6	-8.15	-6	0	0	2	1	3
450	Liberia	1947	1994	43	-6	-6	-7	-6	-6.09	-1	1	1	1	5	4
483	Chad	1962	1994	26	-9	-6	-9	-6	-7.85	-7	2	2	1	7	7
471	Cameroon	1961	1994	34	-6	-6	-8	-6	-7.32	-1	2	2	3	0	1
620	Libya	1951	1994	44	-7	-7	-7	-7	-7.00	0	0	0	0	0	1
816	Democratic Republic o	1954	1994	41	-9	-7	-9	-7	-7.54	0	1	2	0	0	1
700	Afghanistan	1947	1994	45	-10	-8	-10	-7	-8.27	-1	3	1	1	3	3
731	North Korea	1948	1994	47	-7	-8	-9	-7	-8.43	-1	1	1	2	0	1
265	East Germany	1949	1989	41	-7	-8	-9	-7	-8.68	-1	1	1	2	0	1
692	Bahrain	1971	1994	24	-10	-9	-10	-7	-9.67	-3	3	2	1	0	1
690	Kuwait	1963	1994	31	-8	-7	-10	-7	-8.71	-9	2	3	4	1	3
490	Zaire	1960	1994	28	-9	-8	-9	-8	-8.89	-9	1	1	1	7	6
670	Saudi Arabia	1947	1994	48	-10	-10	-10	-10	-10.0	0	0	0	0	0	0
696	United Arab Emirates	1971	1994	24	-10	-10	-10	-10	-10.0	0	0	0	0	0	1

## Interim report on data analysis

A file was constructed with 85 variables and 7100 cases, each of which represents a nation-year. The sample includes 162 nations from 1948 to 1994. The variables incorporate most of the potential predictors of democracy singled out in the previous discussion: level of development, colonial heritage and predecessor states, trade levels broken down by trade partner, and a contiguity matrix. Alternative measures of development have not been compiled. An initial analysis of the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index was conducted for a single cross-section, but it produced no better fit. Given the difficulty of data collection, no further effort was judged appropriate. The data has been only summarily cleaned and should not be considered publication-ready.

Only cursory analyses were conducted, two of which are sketched here. First, a simple OLS regression was performed, without regard for the pooled time series structure of the data. No error diagnostics were performed, though it is evident that severe auto-correlation grossly inflates the apparent significance of the estimated coefficients. Second, each yearly cross-section was separately analyzed with a common model, confirming that the reported t values in the pooled analysis were an artifact of the serial correlation. However, the basic results were otherwise surprisingly similar, as revealed by a comparison between the pooled results and both a simple "mean summary" of each of the cross-sections and a mean weighted by sample size. All three are found at the bottom of the cross-sectional table. No further probing of alternative specifications was performed.

### Results of OLS regression on pooled sample

Variable	Cases	Mean	Std Dev	
DEMO21	5740	-.6246	7.7421	Democracy, 21 point scale
RGDPCH	4285	3802.3956	3832.5918	Real GDP per capita (PPP adjusted)
OPEN	4287	57.6561	39.3784	Trade as %of nominal GDP
DTRADE	4280	.7294	.1504	Democracy of trade partners
BRITCOL	5740	.2746	.4463	Dummy: former British colony

OPREDICT	5740	1.8782	7.0483	Democracy of predecessor	
DEMOCONT	5727	-1.1566	5.9032	Democracy of neighbors	
INSULAR	5740	.0951	.2934	Dummy: Island, no neighbors	
Multiple R	.72776			Analysis of Variance	
R Square	.52964		DF	Sum of Squares	
Adjusted R Square	.52878		7	127242.55643	
Standard Error	5.40368		3870	113003.10551	
			F =	622.52233	
			Signif F =	.0000	
Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
LGDP	2.632756	.105253	.340566	25.014	.0000
BRITCOL	2.810956	.202536	.161856	13.879	.0000
DTRADE	6.557778	.633241	.120333	10.356	.0000
OPEN	-.031451	.002495	-.146999	-12.604	.0000
OPREDICX	.004644	.000799	.065157	5.810	.0000
DEMOCONT	.509092	.017777	.389923	28.638	.0000
INSULAR	4.584033	.292792	.178887	15.656	.0000
(Constant)	-24.071135	.941684		-25.562	.0000

## Findings

**Development: RGDPCH.** Replicating many other studies and confirming modernization theory's basic prediction, democracy increases more or less proportionally to real GDP per capita. Cross-sectional t's in the range of 4 are powerful evidence for this effect. Curvilinearity, so apparent in studies using GDP converted at market exchange rates, is muted with this measure of GDP converted at Purchasing Power Parity. Some curvilinearity remains, but the best fitting specification varies by year and the alternatives are nearly identical.

**Diffusion from neighbors: DEMOCONT.** For each nation-year, DEMOCONT is the average level of democracy of that nation's contiguous neighbors. Pairs of nations defined as contiguous are listed in Appendix Three ("Data"). Procedures for computing these indices are reported in Appendix Four ("Documentation of Data"). Because not all nations have contiguous neighbors, this variable requires a companion, INSULAR, the island dummy. (Islands are assigned DEMOCONT of 0.) The combination of these two variables appears to surpass the explanatory power of development. Whether this should be considered a real diffusion effect or a spatial correlation that requires error-correction adjustments depends upon what O'Loughlin refers to as "Galton's problem", the difficulty of distinguishing outcomes due to diffusion from outcomes produced by parallel, but independent, evolution.

**Diffusion from trade partners: DTRADE.** For each nation-year, DTRADE is the trade-weighted average level of democracy in the nation's trade partners. DTRADE is the summation of four alternative indicators, comprised of a mean and a transformed percentage of trade with nations at a DEMO21 level of +7 or above, each computed separately on both exports and imports. Computation procedures are documented in Appendix Four. During the 1980s DTRADE seems to have a strong effect, but neither before or since. Some simultaneity bias is suspected since other studies have reported that common political systems produce some bias in the partner composition of trade.

**Diffusion from polity origins: OPREDICX and BRITCOL.** OPREDICT (not analyzed) is the democracy value of the predecessor polity, usually the former colonial master at the date of independence. Because many nations have been independent a long time, it is assumed that the contemporary effect is substantially muted. However, only a very preliminary decay measure has been attempted. OPREDICX is OPREDICT divided by logged years of independence. This variable has considerably greater explanatory power than the raw form, but the reverse is true for British colonialism, where the simple dummy is a better predictor. Obviously, there is more to the British experience than simply its democracy: it is a powerful predictor (though it seems to decay after the 1960s) whereas the broader measure is not. OPREDICX is seldom statistically significant, however.

**Other variables: INDEPL, OPEN.** Neither trade levels nor years of independence produced significant results, but the coefficient for OPEN (exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP), was consistently negative, suggesting that trade does not enhance prospects for democracy and may depress them.

	LnGDPper cap		DemNeighbors		IslandDummy		DemTraders		BritColony		OriginDecay		TradeLevel		(Constant)		Multiple		
Year	beta	T	beta	T	beta	T	beta	T	beta	T	beta	T	beta	T	beta	T	r	Year	N
1950	1.46	1.15	0.61	2.70	4.83	1.69	-8.67	-1.22	3.34	1.70	-0.00	-0.67	-0.01	-0.17	-2.16	-0.20	0.704	1950	
1951	1.73	1.16	0.64	2.95	4.01	1.21	-2.44	-0.30	2.79	1.20	0.23	0.60	-0.02	-0.55	-8.52	-0.65	0.701	1951	
1952	1.53	0.91	0.58	2.52	3.75	1.15	-4.38	-0.55	2.74	0.97	0.39	0.70	-0.00	-0.10	-6.02	-0.41	0.661	1952	
1953	2.29	1.54	0.58	2.63	3.41	1.14	-7.89	-1.04	0.90	0.33	0.69	1.20	-0.01	-0.30	-8.67	-0.67	0.676	1953	
1954	3.14	2.34	0.50	2.42	3.59	1.16	-3.83	-0.47	0.71	0.25	0.70	1.09	-0.00	-0.10	-19.11	-1.59	0.659	1954	
1955	3.04	2.44	0.60	3.18	4.11	1.41	-6.87	-0.85	1.87	0.70	0.56	0.87	-0.02	-0.51	-15.84	-1.41	0.720	1955	
1956	2.85	2.75	0.50	2.74	4.91	1.91	-8.58	-1.15	3.49	1.91	0.00	0.38	0.00	0.10	-14.22	-1.56	0.695	1956	
1957	2.78	2.62	0.51	2.73	5.67	2.12	7.96	1.10	3.99	2.07	0.00	0.39	-0.02	-0.50	-26.36	-2.76	0.661	1957	
1958	2.99	2.83	0.67	4.00	5.28	2.13	1.29	0.28	1.94	1.03	0.28	0.80	-0.02	-0.65	-22.17	-2.42	0.751	1958	
1959	2.60	2.48	0.67	3.99	5.85	2.49	-0.19	-0.04	2.59	1.54	0.00	0.41	-0.03	-0.76	-18.02	-1.97	0.759	1959	
1960	3.27	2.48	0.49	3.99	4.14	2.49	4.41	-0.04	2.34	1.54	0.01	0.41	-0.02	-0.76	-26.86	-1.97	0.741	1960	
1961	3.77	4.28	0.43	3.03	3.70	1.87	5.22	1.39	2.84	1.95	0.01	3.02	-0.03	-0.96	-31.53	-4.58	0.753	1961	
1962	3.33	3.57	0.32	2.07	4.50	2.19	5.10	1.30	2.38	1.54	0.01	1.68	-0.02	-0.80	-27.89	-3.91	0.732	1962	
1963	3.50	3.79	0.24	1.58	4.71	2.31	9.17	2.12	2.78	1.84	0.00	0.72	-0.03	-1.17	-31.67	-4.41	0.752	1963	
1964	2.94	3.45	0.36	2.54	4.99	2.44	8.24	2.07	3.87	2.74	-0.00	-0.15	-0.02	-0.92	-27.51	-3.95	0.745	1964	
1965	3.42	4.42	0.27	2.00	4.99	2.38	9.98	2.39	3.93	2.76	0.00	0.60	-0.02	-0.88	-32.87	-5.28	0.730	1965	
1966	3.58	4.82	0.29	2.26	5.14	2.52	7.57	1.96	2.83	2.12	0.01	1.94	-0.02	-0.89	-32.41	-5.44	0.747	1966	
1967	3.45	4.49	0.31	2.34	5.10	2.44	7.10	1.72	3.21	2.44	-0.00	-0.19	-0.00	-0.10	-32.23	-5.14	0.733	1967	
1968	3.55	4.54	0.26	1.97	5.08	2.48	4.59	1.11	3.53	2.64	0.00	0.11	-0.02	-0.80	-30.90	-4.89	0.714	1968	
1969	3.38	4.32	0.33	2.40	4.79	2.42	4.63	0.99	3.78	2.86	0.00	0.25	-0.02	-0.94	-29.96	-4.33	0.734	1969	
1970	3.18	4.57	0.36	2.87	4.88	2.62	6.03	1.49	3.89	3.13	0.00	0.35	-0.03	-1.36	-29.07	-4.56	0.745	1970	
1971	2.99	4.26	0.40	3.32	5.17	2.79	4.67	1.14	3.65	3.00	0.00	0.38	-0.02	-1.31	-26.73	-4.17	0.746	1971	
1972	2.78	3.94	0.52	4.34	4.23	2.40	0.95	0.24	3.56	2.99	0.04	2.08	-0.02	-1.27	-22.74	-3.56	0.767	1972	
1973	3.00	3.48	0.52	4.17	3.61	1.78	3.24	0.75	2.60	1.56	0.40	0.96	-0.04	-1.89	-25.38	-3.56	0.738	1973	
1974	2.82	3.92	0.46	3.73	4.66	2.55	3.00	0.67	3.97	3.19	-0.00	-0.42	-0.03	-1.78	-24.39	-3.82	0.744	1974	
1975	2.83	4.02	0.51	4.39	4.52	2.52	2.22	0.59	3.54	2.90	0.01	0.85	-0.04	-3.00	-22.40	-3.80	0.757	1975	



<b>1976</b>	3.10	4.75	0.48	4.32	3.48	1.96	4.09	0.94	4.37	3.53	0.01	2.21	-0.04	-2.50	-27.00	-4.34	0.745	<b>1976</b>
<b>1977</b>	3.25	4.85	0.49	4.41	3.64	2.00	5.18	1.22	2.87	2.20	0.31	1.44	-0.04	-2.57	-28.64	-4.61	0.748	<b>1977</b>
<b>1978</b>	3.20	4.42	0.47	4.27	3.61	1.87	4.13	0.98	1.99	1.34	0.29	0.83	-0.03	-1.98	-27.71	-4.31	0.715	<b>1978</b>
<b>1979</b>	3.03	4.19	0.47	4.16	3.12	1.57	7.23	1.65	3.55	2.20	0.24	0.60	-0.04	-2.52	-27.93	-4.23	0.725	<b>1979</b>
<b>1980</b>	2.13	3.36	0.58	5.44	4.52	2.32	6.57	1.65	3.08	1.90	-0.05	-0.13	-0.03	-2.12	-20.61	-3.61	0.732	<b>1980</b>
<b>1981</b>	2.40	4.33	0.55	5.54	4.35	2.48	6.64	1.81	2.86	2.39	0.01	1.44	-0.03	-2.18	-23.27	-4.44	0.725	<b>1981</b>
<b>1982</b>	2.67	4.38	0.50	4.79	3.82	2.09	9.01	2.48	2.33	1.59	0.22	0.73	-0.03	-2.14	-26.97	-4.83	0.710	<b>1982</b>
<b>1983</b>	2.77	4.53	0.42	4.12	4.22	2.30	11.73	3.08	3.00	1.96	-0.08	-0.23	-0.03	-2.11	-29.65	-5.42	0.714	<b>1983</b>
<b>1984</b>	2.62	4.27	0.43	4.05	4.47	2.41	11.56	2.94	2.16	1.42	-0.05	-0.13	-0.02	-1.53	-28.59	-5.15	0.706	<b>1984</b>
<b>1985</b>	2.73	4.49	0.44	4.36	4.52	2.44	9.77	2.65	1.85	1.20	-0.07	-0.18	-0.02	-1.58	-28.11	-5.08	0.718	<b>1985</b>
<b>1986</b>	2.72	4.67	0.44	4.26	4.06	2.27	11.62	3.13	2.56	1.73	-0.13	-0.35	-0.03	-2.06	-29.25	-5.36	0.742	<b>1986</b>
<b>1987</b>	2.74	4.68	0.44	4.22	4.29	2.40	11.16	2.97	1.89	1.27	-0.09	-0.23	-0.03	-2.51	-28.64	-5.17	0.743	<b>1987</b>
<b>1988</b>	3.18	5.49	0.31	3.05	3.89	2.14	15.44	3.91	2.25	1.48	-0.27	-0.68	-0.03	-2.15	-35.60	-6.29	0.737	<b>1988</b>
<b>1989</b>	3.13	5.36	0.30	2.92	3.97	2.19	13.91	3.10	2.02	1.34	-0.36	-0.91	-0.03	-2.03	-33.58	-6.08	0.734	<b>1989</b>
<b>1990</b>	3.14	5.29	0.28	2.48	4.85	3.18	7.89	1.67	1.57	1.19	-0.74	-1.90	-0.01	-0.68	-28.82	-5.38	0.810	<b>1990</b>
<b>1991</b>	3.17	4.79	0.28	2.12	4.45	2.56	2.23	0.43	1.24	0.81	-0.54	-1.20	-0.02	-1.17	-23.69	-4.10	0.752	<b>1991</b>
<b>1992</b>	3.64	5.44	0.16	1.14	4.78	2.61	1.49	0.23	0.26	0.17	-0.58	-1.33	-0.02	-1.21	-26.57	-4.20	0.775	<b>1992</b>
<b>Yrly</b>																		<b>Yrly</b>
<b>Mean</b>	<b>2.93</b>	<b>3.81</b>	<b>0.44</b>	<b>3.31</b>	<b>4.41</b>	<b>2.17</b>	<b>4.47</b>	<b>1.17</b>	<b>2.72</b>	<b>1.83</b>	<b>0.03</b>	<b>0.43</b>	<b>-0.02</b>	<b>-1.29</b>	<b>-24.89</b>	<b>-3.81</b>	<b>0.730</b>	<b>Mean</b>
<b>Weig</b>																		
<b>nted</b>																		
<b>Mean</b>	2.97	4.08	0.43	3.45	4.38	2.24	5.74	1.46	2.76	1.92	0.00	0.39	-0.02	-1.47	-26.37	-4.19	0.73	
<b>N=</b>																		<b>N=</b>
<b>3878</b>	2.63	25.0	0.51	28.6	4.58	15.7	6.56	10.4	2.81	13.9	0.00	5.8	-0.03	-12.6	-24.07	-25.6	0.728	<b>3878</b>
	<b>LnGDPp cap</b>	<b>DemNeighbor</b>	<b>IslandDummy</b>	<b>DemTraders</b>	<b>BritColony</b>	<b>OriginDecay</b>	<b>TradeLevel</b>	<b>(Constant)</b>	<b>Multiple r</b>									
<b>Year</b>	beta	T	beta	T	beta	T	beta	T	beta	T	beta	T	beta	T	beta	T	r	<b>Year</b>

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## Investigator biographies

**Michael Ahearn** was born on May 6, 1979 to Michael and Joanne Ahearn. Michael grew up in Upper Makefield, Pennsylvania, with two younger brothers and two younger sisters. He attended Holy Ghost Preparatory school in Bensalem, Pennsylvania from grades nine through twelve where he played lacrosse for four years and served on the Student council as a senior. He was also a member of the World Affairs Club for grades ten through twelve. Michael, currently attending Lehigh University, is a junior who is studying to become English major. Much of Michael's free time is devoted to following the rock and roll band Phish around the United States, as well as reading a wide assortment of books.

**Michael K. Belcak** was born on August 15, 1980 in Bethlehem, PA. He grew up in nearby Wassergass, attending Saucon Valley public schools. There, Mike played oboe in the orchestra, percussion in the band, and participated in the Debate team, Model UN team, Academic team, and National Honors Society. Mike attends Lehigh University, and will graduate with a degree in International Relations in the spring of 2000. At Lehigh, Mike is active with the History Club, International club, and has served as Secretary/Treasurer of the Gaming Club and President of the World Affairs Club. He has interned with Senator Arlen Specter and the U.S. State Department, as well as working as a U.S. Postal Service employee. Mike plans to pursue graduate degrees in political science and international security.

**Keith Coyle** was born on November 25, 1977 to Bernard and Mary Coyle in Marlton, NJ. Keith spent most of his childhood in a small town just outside of Houston, TX before moving to the Philadelphia area in 1988. In 1996, Keith graduated from Pennsbury High School where he participated in cross-country and track and field. He is currently a senior international relations major at Lehigh University and plans to graduate with honors in May. While attending Lehigh Keith has worked as a NCAA certified statistician for the basketball and football teams. He also spent the spring 1999 semester abroad at American University in Washington, DC. Keith plans to attend either law or graduate school after graduation.

**Christine McLaughlin** was born on May 9, 1978 to Mr. and Mrs. Robert A. McLaughlin Jr, in RI. Christine lived in Coventry, RI until the age of 18. She attended The Prout School in Wakefield, RI and graduated in 1996. At Prout, Christine was yearbook editor, a member of the National Honors Society and a member of the International Baccalaureate Program. She played the piano and swam in her free time. Christine is currently a senior at Lehigh University and will graduate in May 2000 with degrees in both Spanish and International Relations. She spent her junior year in Sevilla, Spain, which provided her with the opportunity to travel through Western Europe. She is now able to speak Spanish at an intermediate level. She will begin an internship with the Global Union in the spring. Christine hopes to enter Law School in the fall of 2001 where she will study International Law.

**Ariadna Vazquez** was born on October 22 of 1977 to Eduardo and Angeles Vazquez, in Mexico. Ariadna, better known as Ari, lived in Mexico until she was eleven years old, at which time she moved to Las Cruces, and graduated in 1996. At Onate, Ariadna was Student Body President, and was a member of the Varsity Tennis and Soccer teams. Ariadna is currently a senior at Lehigh University and will graduate in June of 2000 with a degree and International Relations and minors in French and Latin American Studies. While at Lehigh she has been president of the World Affairs club. She spent the spring of 1999 studying in Strasbourg, France and was able to travel throughout Europe. This enabled her to acquire a working knowledge of French. Ariadna is applying to law schools and plans to attend in the fall of 2000. She wants to specialize in International Law.